{
  "tm_meta_title": {
    "en": "Threat Model — ChromVoid"
  },
  "tm_meta_description": {
    "en": "ChromVoid security threat model: assets, trust boundaries, STRIDE analysis, attack scenarios, and honest limitations."
  },
  "tm_breadcrumb_home": {
    "en": "ChromVoid"
  },
  "tm_breadcrumb_threat": {
    "en": "Threat Model"
  },
  "tm_hero_label": {
    "en": "Threat Model"
  },
  "tm_hero_title": {
    "en": "Security through honesty"
  },
  "tm_hero_subtitle": {
    "en": "What ChromVoid protects, what it doesn't, and why we publish limitations."
  },
  "tm_nav_assets": {
    "en": "Assets"
  },
  "tm_nav_trust": {
    "en": "Trust Boundaries"
  },
  "tm_nav_crypto": {
    "en": "Cryptography"
  },
  "tm_nav_storage": {
    "en": "Storage"
  },
  "tm_nav_offline": {
    "en": "Offline-hardening"
  },
  "tm_nav_deniability": {
    "en": "Deniability"
  },
  "tm_nav_threats": {
    "en": "Threat Actors"
  },
  "tm_nav_scenarios": {
    "en": "Attack Scenarios"
  },
  "tm_nav_limitations": {
    "en": "Limitations"
  },
  "tm_nav_recommendations": {
    "en": "Recommendations"
  },
  "tm_nav_audit": {
    "en": "Auditability"
  },
  "tm_nav_disclosure": {
    "en": "Disclosure"
  },
  "tm_back_to_main": {
    "en": "← Back to main"
  },
  "tm_assets_title": {
    "en": "What ChromVoid protects"
  },
  "tm_assets_overview": {
    "en": "ChromVoid is designed for storing passwords, OTP, notes and other secrets with a threat model where physical access, coercion, network attacks, and offline analysis are possible."
  },
  "tm_assets_no_promise": {
    "en": "ChromVoid does not promise \"unhackability\" and does not replace basic security hygiene."
  },
  "tm_assets_detail_title": {
    "en": "Critical assets and metadata"
  },
  "tm_assets_col_asset": {
    "en": "Asset"
  },
  "tm_assets_col_desc": {
    "en": "Description"
  },
  "tm_assets_col_impact": {
    "en": "Impact if compromised"
  },
  "tm_assets_secrets": {
    "en": "Secrets in vault"
  },
  "tm_assets_secrets_desc": {
    "en": "Passwords, keys, TOTP seeds, files"
  },
  "tm_assets_secrets_impact": {
    "en": "Full account compromise"
  },
  "tm_assets_vault_pw": {
    "en": "Vault password"
  },
  "tm_assets_vault_pw_desc": {
    "en": "Password to open a vault"
  },
  "tm_assets_vault_pw_impact": {
    "en": "Access to all secrets in that vault"
  },
  "tm_assets_master_key": {
    "en": "Master key"
  },
  "tm_assets_master_key_desc": {
    "en": "Root of trust for storage"
  },
  "tm_assets_master_key_impact": {
    "en": "Backup/restore, pairing, erase — but NOT data access"
  },
  "tm_assets_device_key": {
    "en": "Device private key"
  },
  "tm_assets_device_key_desc": {
    "en": "Noise Protocol key for the current host"
  },
  "tm_assets_device_key_impact": {
    "en": "Transport channel compromise"
  },
  "tm_assets_session_keys": {
    "en": "Session keys"
  },
  "tm_assets_session_keys_desc": {
    "en": "Active Noise session keys"
  },
  "tm_assets_session_keys_impact": {
    "en": "Current traffic decryption"
  },
  "tm_assets_meta_title": {
    "en": "Sensitive metadata"
  },
  "tm_assets_meta_col_data": {
    "en": "Metadata"
  },
  "tm_assets_meta_col_protection": {
    "en": "Protection"
  },
  "tm_assets_meta_vault_count": {
    "en": "Vault count"
  },
  "tm_assets_meta_vault_count_prot": {
    "en": "Hidden (Plausible Deniability)"
  },
  "tm_assets_meta_record_count": {
    "en": "Records per vault"
  },
  "tm_assets_meta_record_count_prot": {
    "en": "Hidden until unlock (encrypted catalog)"
  },
  "tm_assets_meta_timestamps": {
    "en": "Last access time"
  },
  "tm_assets_meta_timestamps_prot": {
    "en": "Partially — FS timestamps visible"
  },
  "tm_assets_meta_size": {
    "en": "Storage size"
  },
  "tm_assets_meta_size_prot": {
    "en": "Visible (total chunk size)"
  },
  "tm_assets_meta_dirs": {
    "en": "Directory structure"
  },
  "tm_assets_meta_dirs_prot": {
    "en": "Hidden (flat chunk structure)"
  },
  "tm_trust_title": {
    "en": "Trust boundaries"
  },
  "tm_trust_overview": {
    "en": "ChromVoid is built as a zero-trust system. No component is \"trusted by default\". Access is granted through capability grants. All communication is encrypted end-to-end: Noise over USB/WebRTC DataChannel/WSS via Relay."
  },
  "tm_trust_detail_title": {
    "en": "Trust zones and levels"
  },
  "tm_trust_col_zone": {
    "en": "Zone"
  },
  "tm_trust_col_level": {
    "en": "Trust level"
  },
  "tm_trust_col_reason": {
    "en": "Rationale"
  },
  "tm_trust_core": {
    "en": "Core Zone"
  },
  "tm_trust_core_level": {
    "en": "Full"
  },
  "tm_trust_core_reason": {
    "en": "Rust code, verified cryptography"
  },
  "tm_trust_client": {
    "en": "Client Zone (Tauri)"
  },
  "tm_trust_client_level": {
    "en": "High"
  },
  "tm_trust_client_reason": {
    "en": "Controlled code, but vulnerable to host malware"
  },
  "tm_trust_extension": {
    "en": "Browser Extension"
  },
  "tm_trust_extension_level": {
    "en": "Medium"
  },
  "tm_trust_extension_reason": {
    "en": "Isolated context, but less control"
  },
  "tm_trust_network": {
    "en": "Network"
  },
  "tm_trust_network_level": {
    "en": "Zero"
  },
  "tm_trust_network_reason": {
    "en": "Always considered compromised"
  },
  "tm_trust_physical": {
    "en": "Physical device access"
  },
  "tm_trust_physical_level": {
    "en": "Accepted risk"
  },
  "tm_trust_physical_reason": {
    "en": "Not protected from physical access"
  },
  "tm_trust_modes_title": {
    "en": "Operating modes"
  },
  "tm_trust_mode_local": {
    "en": "Local mode: Rust Core built into Desktop/Mobile"
  },
  "tm_trust_mode_mobile": {
    "en": "Mobile host: Phone is source of truth (Secure Enclave/TEE), Desktop connects via USB or WebRTC/WSS"
  },
  "tm_trust_mode_core": {
    "en": "Desktop + Extension: the browser extension connects through Desktop Gateway on localhost; secrets stay in the Desktop app"
  },
  "tm_trust_mode_chain": {
    "en": "Relay path: paired clients can communicate over WebRTC/WSS with end-to-end encrypted transport"
  },
  "tm_crypto_title": {
    "en": "Cryptography"
  },
  "tm_crypto_overview": {
    "en": "Standard cryptographic primitives with no proprietary algorithms. Everything is documented and verifiable."
  },
  "tm_crypto_detail_title": {
    "en": "Primitives and usage"
  },
  "tm_crypto_col_primitive": {
    "en": "Primitive"
  },
  "tm_crypto_col_usage": {
    "en": "Usage"
  },
  "tm_crypto_col_context": {
    "en": "Context"
  },
  "tm_crypto_chacha": {
    "en": "ChaCha20-Poly1305"
  },
  "tm_crypto_chacha_usage": {
    "en": "AEAD data encryption"
  },
  "tm_crypto_chacha_ctx": {
    "en": "At rest"
  },
  "tm_crypto_argon": {
    "en": "Argon2id"
  },
  "tm_crypto_argon_usage": {
    "en": "Memory-hard KDF for password-based key derivation"
  },
  "tm_crypto_argon_ctx": {
    "en": "At rest"
  },
  "tm_crypto_blake": {
    "en": "BLAKE3"
  },
  "tm_crypto_blake_usage": {
    "en": "Hashing and auxiliary material derivation"
  },
  "tm_crypto_blake_ctx": {
    "en": "At rest"
  },
  "tm_crypto_noise": {
    "en": "Noise Protocol (XX/IK/XXpsk0)"
  },
  "tm_crypto_noise_usage": {
    "en": "End-to-end encryption over all channels"
  },
  "tm_crypto_noise_ctx": {
    "en": "In transit (USB / WebRTC / WSS)"
  },
  "tm_crypto_x25519": {
    "en": "X25519"
  },
  "tm_crypto_x25519_usage": {
    "en": "Key exchange within Noise"
  },
  "tm_crypto_x25519_ctx": {
    "en": "In transit"
  },
  "tm_storage_title": {
    "en": "Storage architecture"
  },
  "tm_storage_overview": {
    "en": "ChromVoid uses chunk-based storage. Data is stored as encrypted chunks (~16KB). Each chunk is encrypted separately. Writes are atomic (write-temp-rename) + fsync."
  },
  "tm_storage_detail_title": {
    "en": "Storage security properties"
  },
  "tm_storage_chunk": {
    "en": "Each chunk encrypted independently — simplifies sync, reduces structure \"chattiness\""
  },
  "tm_storage_aad": {
    "en": "AAD = chunk name — protection against swap/chunk substitution attacks"
  },
  "tm_storage_atomic": {
    "en": "Atomic writes (write-temp-rename) + fsync for crash resilience"
  },
  "tm_storage_catalog": {
    "en": "Sharded catalog — domains separated (.passmanager, .wallet, .files)"
  },
  "tm_storage_delta": {
    "en": "Delta sync — only changed chunks are transferred"
  },
  "tm_offline_title": {
    "en": "Offline-hardening"
  },
  "tm_offline_overview": {
    "en": "When an attacker has a copy of your files, ChromVoid applies a \"separate data and hardening material\" approach. Storage data (chunks) is in the filesystem. An additional secret (storage pepper) is stored separately (e.g., in OS keystore) and participates in key derivation."
  },
  "tm_offline_idea": {
    "en": "Idea: \"just copying the folder\" is not enough to conveniently run offline brute-force."
  },
  "tm_offline_warning": {
    "en": "Important: this does not replace a strong passphrase. Argon2id + pepper = delay and complication of offline attack, but not an absolute guarantee."
  },
  "tm_deniability_title": {
    "en": "Plausible Deniability"
  },
  "tm_deniability_overview": {
    "en": "ChromVoid supports a decoy vault + hidden vaults model: no obvious \"wrong password\" signal, minimal metadata about vault count, hidden data boundaries at storage level (flat chunk approach)."
  },
  "tm_deniability_detail_title": {
    "en": "Limitations (important to read)"
  },
  "tm_deniability_limit_1": {
    "en": "Depends on attack class: single-snapshot vs multi-snapshot analysis"
  },
  "tm_deniability_limit_2": {
    "en": "Storage medium properties may leave write traces/remnants"
  },
  "tm_deniability_limit_3": {
    "en": "Your habits (OPSEC): decoy plausibility, usage regularity, structure \"explainability\""
  },
  "tm_deniability_limit_4": {
    "en": "Does not hide that ChromVoid is installed or the total data size"
  },
  "tm_deniability_honest": {
    "en": "ChromVoid publishes these limitations because honesty is part of security."
  },
  "tm_threats_title": {
    "en": "Threat actors"
  },
  "tm_threats_overview": {
    "en": "ChromVoid defends against a range of adversaries — from opportunistic thieves to nation-state actors. Different threat levels require different operating modes."
  },
  "tm_threats_detail_title": {
    "en": "Attacker profiles"
  },
  "tm_threats_col_actor": {
    "en": "Actor"
  },
  "tm_threats_col_resources": {
    "en": "Resources"
  },
  "tm_threats_col_motivation": {
    "en": "Motivation"
  },
  "tm_threats_col_attacks": {
    "en": "Typical attacks"
  },
  "tm_threats_script": {
    "en": "Script kiddie"
  },
  "tm_threats_script_res": {
    "en": "Low"
  },
  "tm_threats_script_mot": {
    "en": "Curiosity"
  },
  "tm_threats_script_att": {
    "en": "Public exploits, phishing"
  },
  "tm_threats_criminal": {
    "en": "Cybercriminal"
  },
  "tm_threats_criminal_res": {
    "en": "Medium"
  },
  "tm_threats_criminal_mot": {
    "en": "Financial"
  },
  "tm_threats_criminal_att": {
    "en": "Malware, credential theft"
  },
  "tm_threats_state": {
    "en": "Nation-state"
  },
  "tm_threats_state_res": {
    "en": "High"
  },
  "tm_threats_state_mot": {
    "en": "Intelligence"
  },
  "tm_threats_state_att": {
    "en": "0-day, supply chain, rubber hose"
  },
  "tm_threats_insider": {
    "en": "Insider"
  },
  "tm_threats_insider_res": {
    "en": "Medium"
  },
  "tm_threats_insider_mot": {
    "en": "Various"
  },
  "tm_threats_insider_att": {
    "en": "Social engineering, physical access"
  },
  "tm_scenarios_title": {
    "en": "Attack scenarios"
  },
  "tm_scenarios_overview": {
    "en": "Concrete scenarios help understand how ChromVoid's defenses work in practice. Each scenario describes the attacker, their goal, the attack vector, and the protection outcome."
  },
  "tm_scenario_col_attacker": {
    "en": "Attacker"
  },
  "tm_scenario_col_goal": {
    "en": "Goal"
  },
  "tm_scenario_col_vector": {
    "en": "Attack vector"
  },
  "tm_scenario_col_defense": {
    "en": "Defense"
  },
  "tm_limits_title": {
    "en": "What we don't protect"
  },
  "tm_limits_overview": {
    "en": "Honest disclosure of limitations is part of our security approach. These are accepted risks."
  },
  "tm_limits_host": {
    "en": "Host compromise during unlock: if the OS is infected and reads screen/keyboard/memory while the vault is open, the risk is high for any password manager."
  },
  "tm_limits_weak_pw": {
    "en": "Weak passwords: KDF slows down brute-force but doesn't make the password strong."
  },
  "tm_limits_social": {
    "en": "Social engineering and user errors: transferring secrets to notes/screenshots/chat."
  },
  "tm_limits_physical_opi": {
    "en": "Physical access to an unlocked host device: software-only protection does not stop direct inspection or memory extraction."
  },
  "tm_limits_supply_chain": {
    "en": "Supply-chain compromise of the host OS, firmware, or device hardware is outside the scope of this threat model."
  },
  "tm_recommendations_title": {
    "en": "Recommendations"
  },
  "tm_recommendations_overview": {
    "en": "Practical guidance to maximize ChromVoid's protection."
  },
  "tm_rec_1": {
    "en": "Use a strong passphrase (4-5 words or ≥12 characters)"
  },
  "tm_rec_2": {
    "en": "Keep decoy vault plausible and \"explainable\""
  },
  "tm_rec_3": {
    "en": "Prefer localhost or direct cable paths when they are available"
  },
  "tm_rec_4": {
    "en": "Enable auto-lock and lock on sleep"
  },
  "tm_rec_5": {
    "en": "Store master_password on paper in a secure place"
  },
  "tm_rec_6": {
    "en": "Make regular encrypted backups"
  },
  "tm_rec_7": {
    "en": "Keep the application updated"
  },
  "tm_rec_priority_critical": {
    "en": "Critical"
  },
  "tm_rec_priority_important": {
    "en": "Important"
  },
  "tm_rec_priority_recommended": {
    "en": "Recommended"
  },
  "tm_audit_title": {
    "en": "Auditability"
  },
  "tm_audit_overview": {
    "en": "ChromVoid's architecture is open and documented. You can verify the security claims yourself."
  },
  "tm_audit_c4": {
    "en": "Architecture diagrams for core, transport, and trust boundaries"
  },
  "tm_audit_adr": {
    "en": "Public repo and protocol specs"
  },
  "tm_audit_api": {
    "en": "API specification (OpenAPI)"
  },
  "tm_audit_cta_arch": {
    "en": "Architecture"
  },
  "tm_audit_cta_github": {
    "en": "Source Code ↗"
  },
  "tm_disclosure_title": {
    "en": "Responsible Disclosure"
  },
  "tm_disclosure_overview": {
    "en": "If you find a vulnerability, please report it responsibly."
  },
  "tm_disclosure_rule_1": {
    "en": "Do not publish PoC publicly before the fix"
  },
  "tm_disclosure_rule_2": {
    "en": "Write to security@chromvoid.com or via GitHub Security Advisories"
  },
  "tm_disclosure_rule_3": {
    "en": "We will confirm receipt and provide status updates"
  },
  "tm_disclosure_email": {
    "en": "security@chromvoid.com"
  },
  "tm_show_details": {
    "en": "Show details"
  },
  "tm_hide_details": {
    "en": "Hide details"
  }
}